This post is derived from a review article: “The Role of Intuition in the Generation and Evaluation Stages of Creativity,” authored by Judit Pétervári, Magda Osman and Joydeep Bhattacharya that appeared in Frontiers of Psychology, September 2016 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01420. It struck me that in all this blog’s posts, creativity had almost never come up. Then I threw it together with Edward O Wilson’s 2017 book: The Origins of Creativity, Liveright Publishing, New York. (See posts Evolution for Everyone and Cultural Evolution for more from Edward O. Wilson. He is the ant guy. He is interesting, understandable, and forthright.)
Creativity is notoriously difficult to capture by a single definition. Petervari et al suggest that creativity is a process that is broadly similar to problem solving, in which, for both, information is coordinated toward reaching a specific goal, and the information is organized in a novel, unexpected way. Problems which require creative solutions are ill-defined, primarily because there are multiple hypothetical solutions that would satisfy the goals. Wilson sees creativity beyond typical problem solving.
This post is largely a continuation of the Kenneth R Hammond post, but one prompted by recent current events. My opinion on gun control is probably readily apparent. But if it is not, let me say that I go crazy when mental health is bandied about as the reason for our school shootings or when we hear that arming teachers is a solution to anything. However, going crazy or questioning the sincerity of people with whom you are arguing is not a good idea. Dan Kahan (See my posts Cultural Cognition or Curiosity or his blog Cultural Cognition) has some great ideas on this, but Ken Hammond actually had accomplishments and they could help guide all of us today. I should note also that I was unable to quickly find the original sources so I am relying completely on: “Kenneth R. Hammond’s contributions to the study of judgment and decision making,” written by Mandeep K. Dhami and Jeryl L. Mumpower that appeared in Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–22.
Why do almost all people tell the truth in ordinary everyday
life? […] The reason is, firstly because it is easier; for
lying demands invention, dissimulation, and a good memory
(Friedrich Nietzsche, page 54, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, 1878)
“I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nut job,” Mr. Trump said, according to the document, which was read to The New York Times by an American official. “I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off.”
Mr. Trump added, “I’m not under investigation.” (Pres. Donald Trump, discussion with Russian diplomats, May 10, 2017).
This post is based on the paper: ” ‘ I can see it in your eyes’: Biased Processing and Increased Arousal in Dishonest Responses,” authored by Guy Hochman, Andreas Glockner, Susan Fiedler, and Shahar Ayal, that appeared in the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, December 2015.
This post is the first of two that look at a book review written by Karl Friston. Friston is the primary idea man behind embodied cognition (see post Embodied (grounded) Prediction (cognition) so far as I can tell. A book review is a chance to read his ideas in a little less formal and easier to understand environment. He reviews The Age of Insight: the Quest to Understand the Unconscious in Art, Mind, and Brain, from Vienna 1900 to the Present by Eric R. Kandel 2012.
This post is a look at the book by Philip E Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting– the Art and Science of Prediction. Phil Tetlock is also the author of Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? In Superforecasting Tetlock blends discussion of the largely popular literature on decision making and his long duration scientific work on the ability of experts and others to predict future events.
In Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Tetlock found that the average expert did little better than guessing. He also found that some did better. In Superforecasting he discusses the study of those who did better and how they did it.
This post is based on the paper: “Cultural differences are not always reducible to individual differences,” written by Jinkyung Na, Igor Grossmann, Michael E. W. Varnum, Shinobu Kitayama, Richard Gonzalez, and Richard E. Nisbett p 6192-6197 | PNAS | April 6, 2010 | vol.107.
As people, I think that we want to believe that cultural differences can be reduced to individual differences. But is it actually true? The authors studied whether or not cultural constructs can be conceptualized as psychological traits at the individual level.
According to the authors, cultural psychology has placed a heavy emphasis on two constructs: social orientation and cognitive style. These two constructs seem applicable to decision making and make me want to apply them when there are international negotiations going on. Some cultures, such as the United States, are characterized by a social orientation valuing independence: emphasizing uniqueness, having relatively low sensitivity to social cues, and encouraging behaviors that affirm autonomy. In contrast, other cultures including China, Japan, and Korea tend to value interdependence: emphasizing harmonious relations with others, promoting sensitivity to social cues, and encouraging behaviors that affirm relatedness to others. Similarly, cultures have been shown to vary along the analytic holistic dimension in cognitive style. Some cultures are analytic: detaching a focal object from the perceptual field, categorizing objects taxonomically, and ascribing causality to focal actors or objects. Other cultures are holistic: paying attention to the entire perceptual field, especially relations among objects and events, categorizing objects on the basis of their thematic relations, and attributing causality to context.
This post is based on the paper: “Harnessing the Wisdom of the Inner Crowd,” written by Stefan M. Herzog and Ralph Hertwig that appeared in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2014, Vol. 18, No. 10. This is a slightly different take on a subject addressed in the posts: Dialectical Bootstrapping and Bootstrapping. Herzog and Hertwig seem to be the go to guys on bootstrapping. In the title they obviously refer to James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds. (see post Smart Mobs and Diverse Problem Solvers). They explain that a lone individual can enlist the wisdom of crowds by averaging self-generated, nonredundant estimates. They review evi-
dence for this ‘wisdom of the inner crowd’, and consider how it can be produced, how its accuracy can be improved, and whether people use it to their advantage. Frankly, Figure 1, above puts the advice in one spot.
This post is based on a paper, “Cross Cultural Differences in Decisions from Experience: Evidence from Denmark, Israel, and Taiwan,” authored by Sibilla Di Guida, Ido Erev, and David Marchiori. It is a 2015 working paper of ECARES. It immediately reminded me Richard Nisbett’s Geography of Thought.
Richard Nisbett in Geography of Thought provides interesting insights into such differences. He divides the world into Easterners and Westerners. Easterners have difficulty in recognizing changes in objects, while Westerners cannot recognize changes in backgrounds. Easterners believe that the world is complicated and inscrutable. Westerners believe that they can understand the world. Westerners create simple and useful models that can be tested, but tend to focus on the object and slight the possible role of context. Westerners are particularly susceptible to the fundamental attribution error–thinking other people’s actions are explained by what they are, while my actions are explained by circumstances. The table below sets out some more distinctions.
object oriented, interventionist-surgery
more engineers/less lawyers
more lawyers/less engineers
avoid conflict–meetings ratify consensus
attempt persuasion, faith in free market of ideas
Japan 2 Nobel prizes in 90s
US 44 Nobel prizes in 90s
Tentative agreed upon guides for future-changeable
Fixed-deal is a deal
ambiguity of causality so that they insist on apology even if seems to be their fault
This post joins several others in being only tangentially related to JDM. It is based on the paper: “The felt presence of other minds: predictive processing, counterfactual predictions, and mentalizing in autism,” that appears in 2015 Consciousness and Cognition. The authors are Colin J. Palmer, Anil K. Seth and Jakob Hohwy. (Post Prediction error minimization)
A central ingredient of social experience is that we represent the mental states of other people. This sense of others’ mental states is a part of our understanding and anticipation of their behavior, and molds our own behavior correspondingly. If our friend shows up to the restaurant with a grim face, we have a sense of her mood and adjust our greeting accordingly. If she glances at our empty glass while pouring herself some wine, we have a sense of her intentions and might move our glass closer. This is the concept of mentalizing.
This post is based on a paper: “Does interaction matter? Testing whether a confidence heuristic can replace interaction in collective decision-making.” The authors are
Dan Bang, Riccardo Fusaroli, Kristian Tylén, Karsten Olsen, Peter E. Latham, Jennifer Y.F. Lau, Andreas Roepstorff, Geraint Rees, Chris D. Frith, and Bahador Bahrami. The paper appeared in Consciousness and Cognition 26 (2014) 13–23.
The paper indicates that there is a growing interest in the mechanisms underlying the ‘‘two-heads-better-than-one’’ (2HBT1) effect, which refers to the ability of dyads to make more accurate decisions than either of their members. Bahrami’s 2010 study, using a perceptual task in which two observers had to detect a visual target, showed that two heads become better than one by sharing their ‘confidence’ (i.e., an internal estimate of the probability of being correct), thus allowing them to identify who is more likely to be correct in a given situation. This tendency to evaluate the reliability of information by the confidence with which it is expressed has been termed the ‘confidence heuristic’. I do not recall having seen the acronym 2HBT1 before, but it does recall the post Dialectical Bootstrapping in which one forms his own dyad, Bootstrapping where one uses expert judgment, and Scott Page’s work Diversity or Systematic Error? However, this is the first discussion of a confidence heuristic.