Monthly Archives: January 2015

Kaku’s Future of the Mind

future ofthemindindexI occasionally like to go far afield from judgment and decision making, and here I go again. This post takes a look at Michio Kaku’s 2014 book, The Future of the Mind–The Scientific Quest To Understand, Enhance, And Empower The Mind, Doubleday, New York.

Decision models can sometimes seem very explanatory, but they seem so simple minded when I read  in Kaku’s book that we have two separate centers of consciousness and that we may all have photographic memories.

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2nd Half of 2009 JDM Research Summary

IMG_0502This post is based on a review paper “Mindful Judgment and Decision Making,” Elke U.Weber and Eric J. Johnson, Annual Review of Psychology, 2009, 60:53–85, on the state of judgment and decision making research. The post is the second half in the outline form set up by Weber and Johnson and more or less summarizes accumulated knowledge.  All I have done is create a sort of Cliff’s Notes version. Much of it is directly quoted without proper attribution in the interest of clarity and my laziness.

MULTIPLE INFORMATION PROCESSES

1. The emotions revolution of the past decade or so has tried to correct the overemphasis on analysis by documenting the prevalence of affective processes, depicting them as automatic and essentially effort-free inputs that orient and motivate adaptive behavior.

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1st Half of 2009 JDM Research Summary

IMG_0512This post is based on a review paper “Mindful Judgment and Decision Making,” Elke U.Weber and Eric J. Johnson, Annual Review of Psychology, 2009, 60:53–85, on the state of judgment and decision making research. The post is in the outline form set up by Weber and Johnson and more or less summarizes accumulated knowledge. It continues in the next post.  All I have done is create a sort of Cliff’s Notes version. Much of it is directly quoted without proper attribution in the interest of clarity and my laziness.

ATTENTION

1. Exogenous Influences

Herbert Simon saw conscious attention as a scarce resource for decision makers. Some features of the environment attract attention because responding to them has survival value. A range of JDM tasks and context characteristics have been examined for their effect of guiding attention and thus decision weight to different outcome dimensions. Violations of procedure invariance are one of the most vexing cases of deviation from normative models of preference. Selling prices typically exceed buying prices by a factor of two, even when strategic misrepresentation is eliminated,

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2009 Review of Judgment and Decision Making Research

IMG_0571This post is based on a review paper “Mindful Judgment and Decision Making,” Elke U.Weber and Eric J. Johnson, Annual Review of Psychology, 2009, 60:53–85, on the state of judgment and decision making research. It is a 2009 paper so I don’t know how I missed it for so long. This should have been my first post. Since the paper is about six years old, it is dated, but it gives a better picture of the state of the art in 2009. If there is a recent comprehensive review, I would love to know about it. I am going to divide the discussion into three posts. This one looks at more general ideas, while the other two will provide some organization and details. As with all review articles Weber and Johnson use it as an opportunity to show off some of their work, and including “mindful” in the title is making their point that psychology with its processes is beginning to step past the earlier economic descriptions of judgment and decision making.

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Heuristic and Linear Models

IMG_0184This post is based on a paper:  “Heuristic and Linear Models of Judgment: Matching Rules and Environments,” written by Robin M. Hogarth and Natalia Karelaia, Psychological Review 2007, Vol. 114, No. 3, 733–758  that predated Hogarth and Karelaia’s (What has Brunswik’s Lens Model Taught?) meta-analysis.  It includes the underpinnings for that study.

Two classes of models have dominated research on judgment and decision making over past decades. In one, explicit recognition is given to the limits of information processing, and people are modeled as using simplifying heuristics (Gigerenzer, Kahneman, Tversky school). In the other (Hammond school), it is assumed that people can integrate all the information at hand and that this is combined and weighted as if using an algebraic—typically linear—model.

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