Tag Archives: Glockner

Celiac Disease and the Prediction Machine

I discovered that I was a celiac a few months ago and accordingly I am on a gluten free diet.  Compared to most conditions discovered in one’s late sixties, celiac disease seems almost inconsequential. However, it fits into the idea of prediction error minimization.  In effect, the environment has changed and I need  to change my predictions. Bread and beer are now bad. My automatic, intuitive prediction machine has not been getting it right. It is disorienting. I can no longer “See food, eat food.” I can change the environment at home, but in the wider world I need to be aware. My brain needs to dedicate perpetual, and at least for now, conscious effort to this cause. It is almost as if I became instantly even dumber.  It makes me more self absorbed in social settings that involve food. Not known for my social skills, I have been a good listener, but now not so much.  On my Dad’s 94th birthday, I ate a big piece of German chocolate cake, enjoyed it thoroughly, and then remembered that it was not allowed. In my particular case, I do not get sick or nauseated when I make such a mistake so my commitment is always under threat. This demands an even larger share of my brain to be compliant. My main incentive to comply is those photos of my scalloped small intestine. I note that I was diagnosed after years of trying to figure out my low ferritin levels. (It will be extremely disappointing if I find that my ferritin is still low.) Continue reading

Dishonesty

Why do almost all people tell the truth in ordinary everyday
life? […] The reason is, firstly because it is easier; for
lying demands invention, dissimulation, and a good memory
(Friedrich Nietzsche, page 54, Human, All Too Human:  A Book for Free Spirits, 1878)

“I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nut job,” Mr. Trump said, according to the document, which was read to The New York Times by an American official. “I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off.”

Mr. Trump added, “I’m not under investigation.”  (Pres. Donald Trump, discussion with Russian diplomats, May 10, 2017).

This post is based on the paper:  ” ‘ I can see it in your eyes’: Biased Processing and Increased Arousal in Dishonest Responses,” authored by Guy Hochman, Andreas Glockner, Susan Fiedler, and Shahar Ayal, that appeared in the  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, December 2015.

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Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Model updated with Learning

This post is based on a draft dated July 10, 2015, “Learning in Dynamic Probabilistic Environments: A Parallel-constraint Satisfaction Network-model Approach,” written by Marc Jekel, Andreas Glöckner, & Arndt Bröder. The paper includes experiments that contrast Parallel Constraint Satisfaction with the Adaptive Toolbox Approach. I have chosen to look only at the update of the PCS model with learning. The authors develop an integrative model for decision making and learning by extending previous work on parallel constraint satisfaction networks with algorithms of backward error-propagation learning. The Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Theory for Decision Making and Learning (PCS-DM-L) conceptualizes decision making as process of coherence structuring in which learning is achieved by adjusting network weights from one decision to the next. PCS-DM-L predicts that individuals adapt to the environment by gradual changes in cue weighting.

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Not that Irrational

This post is from Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 11, No. 6, November 2016, pp. 601–610, and is based on the paper:  “The irrational hungry judge effect revisited: Simulations reveal that the magnitude of the effect is overestimated,” written by Andreas Glöckner. Danziger, Levav and Avnaim-Pesso analyzed legal rulings of Israeli parole boards concerning the effect of serial order in which cases are presented within ruling sessions. DLA analyzed 1,112 legal rulings of Israeli parole boards that cover about 40% of the parole requests of the country. They assessed the effect of the serial order in which cases are presented within a ruling session and took advantage of the fact that the ruling boards work on the cases in three sessions per day, separated by a late morning snack and a lunch break. They found that the probability of a favorable decision drops from about 65% to 5% from the first ruling to the last ruling within each session. This is equivalent to an odds ratio of 35. The authors argue that these findings provide support for extraneous factors influencing judicial decisions and speculate that the effect might be driven by mental depletion. Glockner notes that the article has attracted attention and the supposed order effect is considerably cited in psychology.

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David Brooks- Innocent of Cognitive Continuum

heartindexDavid Brooks seems to be a fascination of mine.  The New York Times columnist surprises me both in positive and negative ways. I only mention it when the surprise is negative. Below is an excerpt from his November 25, 2016, column.

And this is my problem with the cognitive sciences and the advice world generally. It’s built on the premise that we are chess masters who make decisions, for good or ill. But when it comes to the really major things we mostly follow our noses. What seems interesting, beautiful, curious and addicting?

Have you ever known anybody to turn away from anything they found compulsively engaging?

We don’t decide about life; we’re captured by life. In the major spheres, decision-making, when it happens at all, is downstream from curiosity and engagement. If we really want to understand and shape behavior, maybe we should look less at decision-making and more at curiosity. Why are you interested in the things you are interested in? Why are some people zealously seized, manically attentive and compulsively engaged?

Now that we know a bit more about decision-making, maybe the next frontier is desire. Maybe the next Kahneman and Tversky will help us understand what explains, fires and orders our loves.

I can imagine his frustration with the advice world and maybe with Kahneman and Tversky (see post Prospect Theory), but it appears that Brooks is only looking at the advice world. Brooks would benefit by looking at the work of Ken Hammond. The post Cognitive Continuum examines some of Hammond’s 1980 work. Hammond has those chess masters to whom Brooks refers as one extreme of the cognitive continuum.  The post Intuition in J-DM   looks at the work of Tilmann Betsch and Andreas Glockner in what is called Parallel Constraint Satisfaction theory.

Betsch and Glockner believe that information integration and output formation (choice, preference) is intuitive.  Analysis involves directed search (looking for valid cues or asking an expert for advice), making sense of information, anticipating future events, etc.  Thus, they see a judgment as a collaboration of intuition and analysis. The depth of analysis varies, but intuition is always working so preferences are formed even without intention.  Limiting processing time and capacity constrains only input.  Thus, once information is in the system, intuition will use that information irrespective of amount and capacity.

Curiosity might be considered the degree of dissonance we encounter in our automatic decision making that in effect tells us to analyze–find more information and examine it.  We do mostly follow our noses, because it is adaptive. But it is also adaptive to be able to recognize change that is persistent and must be responded to. A parameter of the parallel constraint satisfaction model is the individual sensitivity to differences between cue validities. This implies that individuals respond differently to changing cue validities. Some change quickly when they perceive differences and others change at a glacial pace.

The post Rationality Defined Again:  RUN & JUMP  looks at the work of Tilmann Betsch and Carsten Held. Brooks in his opinion piece seems to be suggesting that analytic processing is pretty worthless. Betsch and Held have seen this before. They note that research on non-analytic processing has led some authors to conclude that intuition is superior to analysis or to at least promote it as such with the obvious example being Malcolm Gladwell in Blink.  Such a notion, however, neglects the important role of decision context. The advantages and disadvantages of the different types of thought depend on the nature of the task. Moreover, the plea for a general superiority of intuition neglects the fact that analysis is capable of things that intuition is not. Consider, for example, the case of routine maintenance and deviation decisions. Routine decisions will lead to good results if prior experiences are representative for the task at hand. In a changing world, however, routines can become obsolete.

In the absence of analytic thought, adapting to changing contexts requires slow, repetitive learning. Upon encountering repeated failure, the individual’s behavioral tendencies will change. The virtue of deliberate analysis, Brooks’ chess mastering, lies in its power to quickly adapt to new situations without necessitating slow reinforcement learning. Whereas intuition is fast and holistic due to parallel processing, it is a slave to the pre-formed structure of knowledge as well as the representation of the decision problem. The relations among goals, situations, options and outcomes that result from prior  knowledge provide the structural constraints under which intuitive processes operate. They can work very efficiently but, nevertheless, cannot change these constraint. The potential of analytic thought dwells in the power to change the structure of the representation of a decision problem.

I believe that Brooks realizes that analytic thought is one thing that distinguishes us from other creatures even though it does not seem to inform much of our decision making. The post Embodied(Grounded) prediction(cognition  might also open a window for Brooks.

Single Strategy Framework and the Process of Changing Weights

 

cloudindexThis post starts from the conclusion of the previous post that the evidence supports a single strategy framework, looks at Julian Marewski’s criticism, and then piles on with ideas on how weights can be changed in a single strategy framework.

Marewski provided a paper for the special issue of the Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition (2015)  on “Modeling and Aiding Intuition in Organizational Decision Making”:  “Unveiling the Lady in Black: Modeling and Aiding Intuition,” authored by Ulrich Hoffrage and Julian N. Marewski. The paper gives the parallel constraint satisfaction model a not so subtle knock:

By exaggerating and simplifying features or traits, caricatures can aid perceiving the real thing. In reality, both magic costumes and chastity belts are degrees on a continuum. In fact, many theories are neither solely formal or verbal. Glöckner and Betsch’s connectionist model of intuitive decision making, for instance, explicitly rests on both math and verbal assumptions. Indeed, on its own, theorizing at formal or informal levels is neither “good” nor “bad”. Clearly, both levels of description have their own merits and, actually, also their own problems. Both can be interesting, informative, and insightful – like the work presented in the first three papers of this special issue, which we hope you enjoy as much as we do. And both can border re-description and tautology. This can happen when a theory does not attempt to model processes. Examples are mathematical equations with free parameters that carry no explanatory value, but that are given quasi-psychological, marketable labels (e.g., “risk aversion”).

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Strategy Selection — Single or Multiple?

spannerindexThis post tries to do a little tying together on a familiar subject. I look at a couple of papers that provide more perspective than typical research papers provide. First is the preliminary dissertation of Anke Söllner. She provides some educated synthesis which my posts need, but rarely get. Two of her papers which are also part of her dissertation are discussed in the posts Automatic Decision Making and Tool Box or Swiss Army Knife? I also look at a planned special issue of the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making to address “Strategy Selection: A Theoretical and Methodological Challenge.”

Söllner’s work is concerned with the question:  which framework–multiple strategy or single strategy– describes multi-attribute decision making best? In multi-attribute decision making we have to choose among two or more options. Cues can be consulted and each cue has some validity in reference to the decision criterion. If the criterion is an objective one (e.g., the quantity of oil), the task is referred to as probabilistic inference, whereas a subjective criterion (e.g., preference for a day trip) characterizes a preferential choice task. The multiple strategy framework is most notably the adaptive toolbox that includes fast and frugal heuristics as individual strategies. Single strategy frameworks assume that instead of selecting one from several distinct decision strategies, decision makers employ the same uniform decision making mechanism in every situation. The single strategy frameworks include the evidence accumulation model and the connectionist parallel constraint satisfaction model.

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Coherence from the default mode network

coherenbrainThis post starts with the paper “Brains striving for coherence: Long-term cumulative plot formation in the default mode network,” authored by K. Tylén, P. Christensen, A. Roepstorff, T. Lund, S. Østergaard, and M. Donald. The paper appeared in NeuroImage 121 (2015) 106–114.

People are  capable of navigating and keeping track of all the parallel social activities of everyday life even when confronted with interruptions or changes in the environment. Tylen et al suggest that even though these situations present themselves in series of interrupted segments often scattered over huge time periods, they tend to constitute perfectly well-formed and coherent experiences in conscious memory. However, the underlying  mechanisms of such long-term integration is not well understood. While brain activity is generally traceable within the short time frame of working memory, these integrative processes last for minutes, hours or even days.

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Big Models

pope155570_600After the three years that I have pushed out other people’s ideas on judgement and decision making, at this moment, I can recall three huge ideas.

I continually look for commment on and expansion of these ideas, and I often do this in the most lazy of ways, I google them.  Recently I seemed to find the last two mentioned on the same page of a philosophy book. That was not actually true, but it did remind me of similarities that I could point out. The idea of a compensatory process where one changes his belief a little to match the current set of “facts” tracks well with the idea that we can get predictions correct by moving our hand to catch the ball so that it does not have to be thrown perfectly. Both clearly try to match up the environment and ourselves. The Parallel Constraint Satisfaction model minimizes dissonance while the Free Energy model minimizes surprise. Both dissonance and surprise can create instability. The Free Energy model is more universal than the Parallel Constraint Satisfaction model, while for decision making PCS is more precise. The Free Energy model also gives us the idea that heuristic models could fit within process models. All this points out what is obvious to us all.  We need the right model for the right job.

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Parameter P- Slowness Factor?

parameterpUntitled

This post looks at Parameter P, a specific construct of the PCS-DM model, as elaborated in “What is adaptive about adaptive decision making? A parallel constraint satisfaction account,” by Andreas Glöckner, Benjamin E. Hilbig, and Marc Jekel (Cognition 133 (2014) 641–666). (See post Revisiting Swiss Army Knife or Adaptive Tool Box.)

Glockner et al state that transformations in Eqs. (3)–(5) (See figure at top of post.) are commonplace and sensitivity analyses have shown that the selection of specific values has little influence on predictions as long as inhibitory connections are relatively strong compared to excitatory connections. PCS-DM predictions, however, strongly depend on Eq. (2). In this equation for calculating connection weights, validities are corrected for chance level (.50) to avoid that irrelevant cues have a weight. Parameter P allows PCS-DM to capture individual differences in the subjective sensitivity to differences in cue validities. Low sensitivity is captured by low P. By contrast, high sensitivity for cue validities is captured by large values of P with high values as special cases in which less valid cues cannot overrule more valid ones. P captures sensitivity at the level of individuals, that is, it determines how an individual transforms explicitly provided or learned information about a cue’s predictive power (i.e., cue validity) into a weight. Glockner et al suggest that P describes a core property of a psychological transformation process that precedes decision making.

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