Tag Archives: Haidt

Moral Coherence

sacredindexThis post is the first after a few technical issues. Some of my decision making has been suboptimal, but we will keep trying. The post is based on a commentary, “Is Anything Sacred Anymore?” that appeared in Psychological Inquiry, 23:  155-161, 2012. The authors are Peter H Ditto, Brittany Liu, and Sean P Wojcik. The commentary examines the paper: “The Moral Dyad: A Fundamental Template Unifying Moral Judgment,” by Gray, Waytz, and Young, that appeared in the Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory, 23:2, 206-215. I have found commentary articles easier for me to understand since they have to examine two or more positions.

Ditto et al agree with Gray et al about the central role of mind perception in moral judgment and are intrigued by the idea that moral evaluation requires not just an intentional moral agent but also a suffering moral patient, and moreover that this dyadic structure of agent and patient, intention and suffering is the center of morality. They do not agree that interpersonal harm is the very meaning of morality, that no act can be morally offensive unless it is perceived to result in suffering.

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Simultaneous feeling and deciding

wurzburgindexThis post is based on a doctoral dissertation: “Just do it! Guilt as a moral intuition to cooperate–A parallel constraint satisfaction approach,” written by Thomas Stemmler at the University of Wurzburg. Stemmler does a good job of fitting together some ideas that I have been unable to fit together. Ideas of Haidt, Glockner, Lerner, and Holyoak are notably connected.  He conducted five experiments examining guilt and cooperation to test, in the most simple terms, the hypothesis that making moral judgments is closer to making an aesthetic judgment than to reasoning about the moral justi fications of an action, and that moral intuitions come from moral emotions. The hypothesis is based on  Jonathan Haidt’s idea that the role of reasoning is literally to provide reasons (or arguments) for the intuitively made judgment if there is a need to communicate it. Part of the hypothesis is also that emotional intuitions in moral decision-making are the result of compensatory information processing which follows principles of parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS).  I am going to largely skip over the results of the experiments, but note that Stemmler believes that they support his hypothesis. He notes that guilt is only one emotion, but points out similarly confirming results for disgust.

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Justifying our Decisions: Great for Plausible Deniability, not so Great for Medical Diagnosis

Sadly, Larry had always approached from the side that wasn't posted and a natural treasure was destroyed before anyone could react

Sadly, Larry had always approached from the side that wasn’t posted and a natural treasure was destroyed before anyone could react

I am looking at the idea of “justification” as discussed separately by Kenneth R Hammond, Jonathan Haidt, and Steve Catty and Jamin Halberstadt.

Ken Hammond created the JDM metatheory dichotomy of coherence and correspondence.  Coherence tests decisions on rationality while correspondence tests decisions on empirical accuracy.  Coherence advocates start with the mind of the decision maker.  In examining rationality of judgment, the main criterion is consistency.  Bayes’ theorem is the model for mathematical coherence of decision making. Coherence focuses on justification.  It describes departures from “ought” coherence.

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