This post is based on a paper: “Heuristic and Linear Models of Judgment: Matching Rules and Environments,” written by Robin M. Hogarth and Natalia Karelaia, Psychological Review 2007, Vol. 114, No. 3, 733–758 that predated Hogarth and Karelaia’s (What has Brunswik’s Lens Model Taught?) meta-analysis. It includes the underpinnings for that study.
Two classes of models have dominated research on judgment and decision making over past decades. In one, explicit recognition is given to the limits of information processing, and people are modeled as using simplifying heuristics (Gigerenzer, Kahneman, Tversky school). In the other (Hammond school), it is assumed that people can integrate all the information at hand and that this is combined and weighted as if using an algebraic—typically linear—model.
My most examined post What Has Brunswik’s Lens Model Taught? was based on a paper authored by Karelaia and Hogarth. It only seems right to look at some of Karelaia’s other work. This post is based on a working paper from INSEAD, “Improving Decision Making through Mindfulness,” authored by Natalia Karelaia and Jochen Reb, forthcoming in Mindfulness in Organizations, Reb, J., & Atkins, P. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press.
This paper is a review of the literature surrounding the premise that even when it comes to making decisions, an activity that is often quite conscious, deliberate and intentional, people are typically not as aware as they could be. Karelaia and Reb argue that as a result, decision quality may suffer and that mindfulness, the state of being openly attentive to and aware of what is taking place in the present, both internally and externally, can help people make better decisions. Figure 1 is an excerpt from the paper.