Tag Archives: Pohl

Questions about the Recognition Heuristic


rh6002This is the second post based on Pohl’s paper, “On the Use of Recognition in Inferential Decision Making.”  Pohl looks at what have come to be seen as weaknesses of the recognition heuristic.

Recognition as a memory-based process
While acknowledging that recognition should generally be treated as a continuous variable, Goldstein and Gigerenzer  focused on the outcome of this recognition process, which is either “recognized” or “not recognized” with only a small and negligible gray zone of uncertainty in between. Accordingly, the quality of these subjective recognition judgments, that is, whether
they were true or not or with what confidence, was originally not considered. Meanwhile, some researchers have asked whether and how the recognition process itself possibly affects subsequent inferences.

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On the Use of Recognition in Inferential Decision Making


sanantonio450This post and the next post are based on Rudiger Pohl’s article, “On the Use of Recognition in Inferential Decision Making” that appeared in the Journal of Judgment and Decision Making in 2011.  The Journal had three issues devoted to recognition.  Pohl provides the best summary and is also the last.  I found that some of the articles with two or three authors trying to come up with a summary failed apparently because there was so much disagreement among the authors.

“Intuition is nothing more or less than recognition.”  Daniel Kahneman delivers this and credits Simon in Thinking Fast and Thinking Slow.  Pohl’s article does not address this statement, but it helps me address it. Maybe the statement is not making intuition simpler, but making recognition much more complicated.

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